

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

OSD, DOS, JCS reviews  
completed

June 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JH*

SUBJECT: The PRC and Arms Control

At Tab A is an issues paper on the PRC and arms control which was prepared by ACDA for the NSC Meeting of March 25 on MSSMs 106 and 107. ACDA proposed in this paper that we take an appropriate opportunity to exchange views with the PRC on: a renunciation of force declaration; a Washington-Peking hot line; information exchange on nuclear weapons safeguards; agreement not to possess biological weapons; Pugwash-type unofficial arms control talks; and a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communication.

You will recall that the consensus at the March 25 NSC meeting was that ACDA's proposals were not a matter of urgent priority. I have reservations with respect to several of them, as follows:

-- The renunciation of force proposal carries with it too many connotations of the sterile debate in which we and the PRC engaged for so long over a renunciation of force agreement that touched on Taiwan, and the failure to touch on Taiwan in its present wording might give the PRC grounds for dealing with Taiwan as an internal issue. Certainly the political effect on the ROC would be severe.

-- An agreement not to possess biological weapons might cause the Chinese to bring up the "germ warfare" charges which they made against us in the Korean war. We certainly do not wish to rehash the past, and the ACDA paper itself lists more disadvantages than advantages.

-- The five-power conference might smack too much to the Chinese of an effort to impose nuclear restrictions on them and hence be objectionable. To Peking, the NPT and the Partial Test Ban Treaty were "nuclear blackmail," i. e. efforts by the nuclear superpowers to restrict the ability of the lesser powers to develop their defensive capability.

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At Tab B are the sections of NSSM 124 on next steps toward the PRC which list the groups of recommended options, including arms control options, we might wish to follow. You will notice that the State, Defense, and CIA have had much the same reservations as I have had (although not for precisely the same reasons), and list an information exchange on nuclear weapons safeguards and Pugwash-type meetings under Group I; a Washington-Peking hot line under Group II; and a renunciation of force agreement and a five-power meeting under Group III.

It might be noted that the renunciation of force question is not strictly speaking an arms control option, since it involves a much wider range of relationships. At Tab C is a paper on this issue which was prepared by State at your direction as a follow-up to the SRG meeting which preceded the March 25 NSC meeting. It points out the problems and disadvantages with respect to the ROC and opinion in other parts of Asia, and suggests means of handling these reactions.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1971

OFFICE OF  
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: China and Arms Control -  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM


I attach our issues paper on "US-China Arms Control Talks", which you asked about at the Senior Review Group meeting on Friday, March 12.

This is a planning paper. Action in this field would presumably have to await the resumption of the Warsaw talks, except that:

-- We have carried out one of the recommendations. We suggested to the Romanians that they invite Chinese participation in Pugwash, to be held in Bucharest this year.

-- We are now developing with the State Department a response to your request to Under Secretary Irwin regarding a renunciation of force declaration.

The other proposals in the paper need inter-agency review.

  
Philip J. Farley  
Acting Director

Attachment:  
Issues Paper - "US-China Arms Control Talks"

Group 1

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ISSUES PAPER

US-CHINA ARMS CONTROL TALKS

*[Signature]*  
Acting Director

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Group 1

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ISSUES PAPER

US-China Arms Control Talks

After the Warsaw talks with China resume, or in another appropriate forum, the US should propose an exchange of views on one or more of the following arms control measures:

- a renunciation of force declaration
- a Washington-Peking hot line
- information exchange on nuclear weapons safeguards
- agreement not to possess biological weapons
- Pugwash-type unofficial arms control talks
- a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communication.

These measures have been selected because they might provide some common ground between the US and the PRC where there has been none before. Discussions with China at Warsaw in 1955 about a renunciation of force declaration based on a draft presented by China failed to result in an agreement. While there has been some limited and general discussion of arms control at Warsaw, we have never made specific proposals which could provide the basis for an exploratory dialogue or for understandings or agreements with Peking on arms control matters.

From the US point of view, these proposals could carry forward the President's policy of seeking improvement of relations with Peking. Within the context of the triangular

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US-Soviet-China relationship, they would be a partial but nonetheless significant counterpoise to the special US-Soviet relationship represented by SALT. They would give meaning and content to our declared policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Arms talks with the PRC would also favorably affect developments in Japan, alleviating Japanese concerns over Peking's growing nuclear capability and constricting those in Japan who might wish to rearm. Finally, as Peking's nuclear capability grows it is increasingly important and urgent that we find areas of possible consensus between the US and the PRC on arms control.

The PRC might value discussion of these measures because of their political significance, not necessarily for their intrinsic arms control value. Peking might believe that some responsiveness to US initiatives on arms control would be interpreted as signaling an interest in a change in US-PRC relations and would enhance Peking's bargaining power vis-a-vis Moscow.

Peking will probably remain unwilling to consider wider arms control measures, like the test ban, which might inhibit its ability to build a credible nuclear deterrent force against superior and hostile forces. It would be unrealistic at this stage to propose such measures. It would be equally unproductive at this time to propose measures like the NPT which Peking has regarded as an expression of US-Soviet collusion against her. In the somewhat longer run, the PRC may see the success of non-proliferation to be in its own interest.

Soviet reaction to any US arms control initiative toward Peking is difficult to predict. A US initiative could conceivably strengthen the hand of those within the Kremlin who have an almost paranoiac tendency to exaggerate the threat from China and who press for greater military expenditures and an acceleration of the arms race. On the other hand, others within the Kremlin might believe the Soviets could best correct a deteriorating power balance by conciliatory moves toward the US or the PRC, or both. Finally, some Soviet decision makers might welcome a US arms control initiative as a means of bringing China into meaningful arms control agreements, such as the NPT and the Test Ban Treaty.

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The measures proposed above could not on the basis of any objective criteria be considered anti-Soviet, although some of them might be attacked as such by Soviet propagandists. Any step, like a hot line, which reduces the danger of accidental nuclear war would be in the Soviet interest as well as in our own. It is difficult to see how any of the measures suggested here would be in conflict with any possible SALT agreement. We would need to carefully weigh the status of SALT and of our relations with the Soviets at the time we put forward any of the above proposals at Warsaw. It would also be necessary to formulate our arms control posture toward the PRC to avoid conflict with a SALT agreement.

GRC leadership probably would be extremely concerned by any US initiative toward Peking in the field of arms control. However limited that initiative, the GRC probably would interpret it as a major move in the direction of a political accommodation with the PRC and would be fearful that it pre-saged other substantial steps. If these moves were made prior to a resolution of the Chinese representation issue, the GRC reaction probably would prejudice our ability to work effectively with the GRC in dealing with that problem.

The Japanese would on the whole welcome arms control measures that appeared to be leading to a relaxation of tensions in East Asia. Provided the GOJ were kept informed of US initiatives, we could expect a favorable reaction. While it is possible that the prospect of reduced tensions might open an opportunity for those in Japan who would loosen US-Japan ties, particularly in the security field, careful consultation with the GOJ should serve to reduce this possibility to manageable proportions.

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## RENUNCIATION OF FORCE

We could propose that the US and the PRC issue the following declaration, based on language and principles of the UN Charter:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China hereby declare their determination to settle all disputes which may arise between the two nations without resort to force or the threat of force, including nuclear force. As part of this declaration, both governments declare and resolve to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force, including nuclear force, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

### Advantages:

1. The declaration would be important for its political significance -- a first step toward improved relations between the US and the PRC. It would achieve this without any additional commitment on the part of the US since the language of the declaration would simply extend basic provisions of the UN Charter to the US-PRC relationship.

2. The declaration would protect the US nuclear deterrent against possible PRC aggression but still meet Peking's desire for assurance that the US will not launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against her. The right of individual or collective self-defense would in no way be impaired. Action by the US to help defend a country under attack could not convincingly be claimed to be use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence" of the attacking state.

3. It could help to reassure Asian states against the threat, real or imagined, of Chinese nuclear blackmail through the explicit renunciation of the threat of nuclear force against third countries.

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4. In view of the proposal on non-use of force put forward by the Chinese at Warsaw in 1955, it is possible that the above declaration could offer ground for agreement, providing each side were prepared not to condition agreement on acceptance of its position on Taiwan.

5. The agreement would be welcomed widely by third countries in Asia which desire to avoid becoming embroiled in a nuclear war. They would see an agreement as raising -- or at least maintaining -- the present nuclear threshold in Asia -- that is, as tending to rule out the use of weapons except in the most extreme and catastrophic situations.

Disadvantages:

1. The agreement would have no more force than any other such "paper" agreement and might therefore give the illusion but not the substance of a change in US-PRC relations. On the other hand, we have not opposed Bonn's negotiating a renunciation-of-force agreement with Moscow -- and, in a sense, we have a multilateral agreement of this type in the UN Charter.

2. Some would argue that the declaration could be interpreted as an indication that the US is prepared to ignore Communist expansion which seems short of overt attack.

3. The Soviets could see the agreement as giving the Chinese a somewhat freer hand to increase pressure against the Soviet Union, although such increased pressure would not necessarily result in a hardening of US-Soviet relations.

4. Peking could attempt to exploit the document as indicating US agreement not to interfere with the PRC's "sacred right" to liberate Taiwan as a purely domestic matter.

5. The GRC would probably oppose a renunciation-of-force agreement with the PRC and would press hard for assurances that this would in no way alter the US agreement under the security treaty. It would also probably feel compelled to assert publicly that such a declaration did not circumscribe its own freedom of action.

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WASHINGTON-PEKING HOT LINE

We could propose that the United States and the PRC establish a direct, secure communications link between Washington and Peking.

Advantages:

-- The most important use of a hot line would be during urgent crises, such as those following the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. (Direct messages now must be transmitted through the Embassies in Warsaw or via open-telecommunications circuits in London).

-- In the absence of diplomatic relations, both nations could also use the hot line to transmit important messages, regarding, for example, emergency recovery of manned spacecraft, the outbreak of hostilities in third countries, aircraft hijackings, or for other sensitive diplomatic exchanges.

-- This technical communications link would have the effect of decreasing the political distance between the US and China.

-- The Chinese could easily accept this proposal without encumbering it with the Taiwan issue or other extraneous political conditions.

Disadvantages:

-- The Soviets might see a hot line as a further means of secret diplomatic communications between their two principal adversaries.

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INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFEGUARDS

As a first step in discussing with Peking the problem of accidental nuclear war, we could provide the Chinese with the considerable amount of unclassified material available on the US nuclear weapons safety program. We would invite an exchange of views and information on this subject.

Advantages:

-- Whether reciprocated or not, our approach could benefit the US indirectly by focussing Chinese attention on the potential dangers involved in nuclear deployment, while giving an earnest of our desire to discuss more advanced methods to limit the dangers of accidental war.

-- Should the PRC respond in kind, we would gain valuable information on the Chinese weapons safety program, about which nothing is now known.

-- In contrast to the other measures discussed in this paper, such an exchange of information can be carried out privately between the US and China, and thus minimize any risk of Soviet charges of collusion against her.

Disadvantages:

-- This action alone would not remove Chinese suspicion and reluctance to discuss arms control measures with the US.

-- There is a possibility, which could be minimized, that Peking might view our action as patronizing.

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AGREEMENT NOT TO POSSESS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

After we ratify the Geneva Protocol, we could propose to the Chinese at Warsaw a joint statement renouncing the development, production and stockpiling of biological warfare agents.

Advantages:

-- On November 25, 1969, the President, in addition to announcing his intention to submit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification, unilaterally renounced on behalf of the US the use of lethal biological agents and all other forms of biological warfare. A proposal to the Chinese would be consistent with this statement and with our desire to encourage other states to renounce BW.

Disadvantages:

-- The Chinese Communists, who reaffirmed in 1952 their country's commitment to the Geneva Protocol, hold that chemical riot control agents are prohibited by the Protocol. Any effort to discuss with the Chinese matters covered in the Protocol would probably lead them to bring up our use of tear gas in Vietnam and our reservations regarding its inclusion in the Protocol.

-- There is no reason to believe that the Chinese would go any further toward admitting separate discussion of CW and BW than some other nations, including the Russians.

-- Raising BW with the Chinese would offer them an opportunity to reopen allegations that the US used "germ warfare" in Korea.

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PUGWASH

We might propose to the PRC that (a) they permit Chinese participation in the annual Pugwash meetings or (b) an unofficial Pugwash-type meeting be held between the US and China under the auspices of a third party such as the Swedish International Peace Research Institute. (We have recently suggested to the Romanians that they might wish to invite PRC participation in the 1971 Pugwash meeting in Romania).

Advantages:

-- PRC attendance at Pugwash-type meetings would provide opportunity for beginning a serious dialogue with the Chinese on arms control matters. Such discussions would establish useful personal contact between Chinese and American specialists.

-- The agenda for Pugwash meetings is broad and flexible and would thus enable us to explain the more theoretical and sensitive concepts of US strategic and arms control policy which might not be suitable at this stage for the more formal Warsaw talks.

-- We might gain valuable insights into Chinese thinking on strategic and arms control questions.

-- Such talks could be held concurrently with the Warsaw talks, and since they would be presumably more open and free-wheeling than an official exchange, might explore ground that could later be the subject of an official proposal.

-- The unofficial label of the discussions would lessen the repercussions such talks would have on the US-Soviet relationship.

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Disadvantages:

-- To the extent such meetings would imply American acceptance of the Peking regime, some ~~would~~ argue that it would weaken our opposition to Peking in other areas and adversely affect our relations with Taiwan.

-- If the Soviets were not invited to the talks, their fear of US-Chinese collusion would be fed, but to no greater degree than they are by the Warsaw talks.

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MEETING OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS

The United States, Britain and the USSR, the nuclear powers now active in arms control negotiations, could invite the other two nuclear powers, the PRC and France, to meet with them to exchange information and discuss accidental nuclear explosions or launchers, accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communications. The timing of this proposal should be related to SALT to insure that it did not adversely affect prospects for a US-Soviet strategic arms limitation agreement.

Advantages:

1. China's agreement to participate in such a meeting would be politically important in terms of US-Soviet-China relations, particularly in respect to our declared policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It would provide a means for exploring Chinese attitudes toward arms control and the long-term prospects for arms control understandings involving all the nuclear powers.
2. Discussions of this kind would meet France's objection to arms control talks that do not include all the nuclear states and could end France's long estrangement from the world arms control community.
3. All the nuclear powers would have a real interest in this subject. The Soviets would presumably be interested because it would involve France as well as China and might meet some of their concerns as expressed in SALT.

Disadvantages:

1. Regardless of whether they felt compelled to accept our proposal, the Soviets might suspect our motives in making

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it and ascribe to us a desire to embarrass the Soviet Union in its relations with China and commence using arms control talks for propaganda purposes.

2. If the PRC accepted, it might try to use the talks to exploit differences on arms control between the United States, on the one hand, and Soviet Union and France, on the other.

3. The GRC would probably see even an invitation to Peking as according the PRC the status of a major power.

4. Japan and other countries as well might be disturbed by the appearance of a nuclear-power monopoly.

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LISTING OF OPTIONS IN GROUP I

1. Option: Cultural, Scientific and Industrial Exchange

- A. Inform all USG agencies that we encourage the inclusion of the PRC in exchange programs operated with USG funds.
- B. Offer an exchange of weather information (technical official level) and other unclassified scientific data (technical official level and/or private).

2. Option: Transportation: Sea and Private and Charter Aviation

- A. Announce authorization for US-flag merchant ships to call at PRC ports and express willingness to facilitate clearance of PRC-flag merchant ships for entry into US ports.
- B. Announce that the prohibition on US commercial charter and general aircraft operating to the PRC is being rescinded and that the US is prepared to facilitate entry of PRC civil aircraft into the US on a non-scheduled basis.

3. Option: Trade Initiative

Place the PRC in Country Group "Y", thereby permitting exports to the PRC, without prior validated licenses of all commodities and technical data not now under prior licensing control to the USSR.

4. Option: Trade Promotion

- A. Encourage private organizations to invite a PRC trade delegation to the US.
- B. Encourage private American groups to invite the PRC to exhibit at a trade fair in the US.
- C. Encourage joint meetings between the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong and a local PRC organization.

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5. Option: Arms Control

- A. Propose an information exchange on nuclear weapons safeguards.
- B. Invite PRC attendance at Pugwash-type meetings.

6. Option: US Military Presence on Taiwan

Reduce to a minimum or where possible eliminate surface and air reconnaissance and intelligence activities that infringe on territory controlled by the PRC.

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LISTING OF OPTIONS IN GROUP II

1. Option: Cultural and Scientific Exchange

Official Cultural Exchange

1. Propose USG-sponsored exchanges of medical teams or farm leader groups (low visibility option).
2. Propose USG-sponsored exchanges of sports teams or performing arts groups (high visibility option).

2. Option: Trade Promotion

- A. Invite a PRC trade delegation to the US (USG invitation).
- B. USG invite the PRC to exhibit at a USG-sponsored trade fair in the US.

3. Option: US Presence in the People's Republic of China

- A. Propose the opening of a trade mission on the mainland under the auspices of the US Chamber of Commerce.
- B. Propose the opening of a USG Commercial Office on the mainland.

4. Option: Status of the GRC

State publicly that the US does not take a position on the question of which is the legitimate government of China. Reiterate that the US recognizes and maintains diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan and views the People's Republic of China as the effective government of mainland China and deals with it on matters of mutual interest.

5. Option: Arms Control

Propose a Washington-Peking Hot Line.

6. Option: US Military Presence on Taiwan

Reduce US forces on Taiwan in consonance with the withdrawal of US forces from Viet-Nam, for example, withdraw the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing and supporting units at CCK Air Base and College Eye Task Force; no other US military units would be deployed to Taiwan in substitution for these.

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LISTING OF OPTIONS IN GROUP III

1. Option: Official Trade Missions

- A. Propose an official trade mission headed by the Secretary of Commerce, comprised of representatives of US business and possibly high-ranking officials from other US Government agencies.
- B. Invite the PRC to send a ministerial-level official trade mission to the US.

2. Option: Status of the GRC

- A. Make clear that we do not support the GRC claim to be the government of all of China but recognize it only as exercising legitimate authority over Taiwan.
- B. Take the position that we regard the PRC as the legitimate government of the territory over which it now exercises control while continuing to recognize the GRC as the legitimate authority over Taiwan.

3. Option: Status of Taiwan

State that we regard Taiwan to be part of China, but that we believe its relationship to the mainland should be determined peacefully by the parties concerned.

4. Option: Blocked Chinese Assets and US Claims

- A. Offer to negotiate with the People's Republic of China an over-all claims settlement.
- B. Unilaterally unblock frozen PRC assets.
- C. Unblock assets of third country banks in which the PRC possesses an indirect interest as a creditor.

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5. Option: US Presence in the People's Republic of China
  - A. Propose establishment on a reciprocal basis of a small component in a friendly embassy in Peking manned by third country nationals or by USG officials.
  - B. Propose on a reciprocal basis the establishment of official or semi-official offices with consular functions in Peking/Shanghai/Canton.
6. Option: Arms Control
  - A. Propose a renunciation of force agreement.
  - B. Propose a meeting of five nuclear powers.
7. Option: US Military Presence in the Taiwan Area
  - A. Further reduce the Taiwan Strait Patrol.
  - B. Further reduce the US military presence on Taiwan.
  - C. Maintain only a small military liaison group on Taiwan.

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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March 24, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Office of the Vice President  
Office of the Secretary of State  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Office of the Director of Emergency  
Preparedness

SUBJECT: Renunciation of Force Agreement with  
PRC (NSSM 106)

Attached is the paper on a possible Renunciation of Force Agreement with the People's Republic of China, prepared by the Department of State as a follow-up to the discussion at the March 12 Senior Review Group meeting on NSSM 106.

The paper will serve as background for the discussion at the NSC meeting on March 25.

  
Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

Attachment

cc: Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director of Central Intelligence

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US-CHINA: RENUNCIATION OF FORCE

We would view a renunciation of force agreement as a symbolic registering of an improvement in US-PRC relations which would follow and reflect such an improvement. A possible text and discussion of factors which would have to be taken into account follow:

I. Text of the Declaration

The following language, based on Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, could serve as the basis of a declaration:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China hereby declare their determination to settle all disputes which may arise between the two nations without resort to force or the threat of force, including nuclear force. As part of this declaration, both Governments declare their resolve to refrain from the use or threat of force, including nuclear force, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

II. Purpose and Timing

A. Purpose: The major purpose of the declaration would be political. Chinese agreement to it would symbolize a major change in US-PRC relations. The declaration is silent on the issue of Taiwan. Both sides would thus have to agree tacitly to disagree on this issue, and postponing its resolution would be an important step forward in US-PRC relations.

It would not add to US commitments, since the PRC would be adhering to principles we already subscribe to in the UN Charter.

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B. Timing: Any US initiative on this issue should await the reopening of the Warsaw Talks. Therefore, possible timing would depend very much on the Chinese. It seems unlikely that the Chinese would agree to resume the talks at Warsaw (or elsewhere) until the operation in Laos has wound down and until announcement of additional troop withdrawals from Viet Nam.

We would not propose that a renunciation of force agreement be broached to the Chinese as soon as the Warsaw Talks resume. After Chinese reaction to other proposals has shown whether Peking was seriously interested in improved relations, we could determine how and when to proceed.

Depending on the foregoing, we should take into account the following factors in considering how best to proceed:

-- The possible desirability (from the standpoint of US/PRC relations) of broaching the subject at a point in time when we might best capitalize on our diminishing involvement in Indochina and signal to the PRC our desire for a more stable situation in the future.

-- The probably lengthy period required to explore and possibly conclude the proposed agreement once the subject had been raised.

-- The need, if an agreement appeared likely, to lay the groundwork with our Asian allies in order to minimize any possibility of misunderstanding or adverse reaction.

-- In this connection, issuing a public reaffirmation that the agreement did not affect our commitment to the GRC (or our commitment to others).

III. Reactions

A. PRC Reaction: It is not possible to predict with confidence how Peking might react to a proposed agreement along the foregoing lines.

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The possibility of such an agreement was raised by the PRC in 1955 in the bilateral ambassadorial talks. The US at that time believed an explicit statement covering Taiwan should be included in any agreement. The PRC position then hardened.

The text suggested above would seek to set aside the Taiwan issue. An important indicator of Peking's attitude would be whether and how it raised the Taiwan question. If Peking immediately claimed that the agreement would not apply to Taiwan, we would have to assume that the PRC was not willing to finess that issue; hence, the proposal might prove to be a non-starter. However, if Peking refrained from injecting the Taiwan issue or raised it in a manner which appeared negotiable, this would be a good indication of Peking's willingness to be flexible.

Two key factors which would influence Peking's reaction would be the state of US involvement in Indochina, and developments regarding possible PRC entry into the UN. If the PRC saw satisfactory movement in these areas, it might then be more inclined to respond favorably to the possibility of a suggested renunciation of force agreement.

From our viewpoint, little or nothing would be lost if Peking rejected the proposal, especially if this were done in the privacy of the Warsaw talks. Whether accepted or not, a US initiative in this direction might be perceived by Peking as a serious move on our part to offset its concerns over our actions in Indochina and to signal our intention of securing a stable settlement in East Asia. Peking's response might give a measure of its concerns and the direction of its policy toward us.

#### B. Other Asian Reaction

1. Effect on GRC. The GRC would oppose such an agreement and press hard for further assurances that it would not alter the US commitment under the Mutual Security Treaty. Taipei might feel compelled to assert publicly that such a declaration did not circumscribe its own freedom of action.

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We could point out that although the agreement was silent on the question of Taiwan, it would be politically difficult for Peking to join in such a declaration and then do an apparent about face and seek to employ force against Taiwan. We could also point out that the agreement did not in fact alter our commitment to Taiwan and that Peking was under no illusions in this regard.

2. Effect on other Asian states. Other Asian allies are already experiencing some concern over the reduction of the US presence in Asia. They would probably want reassurance that the agreement did not affect our commitment to them, and we should be prepared to provide such reassurance. At the same time, we should stress the general advantages for stability in the area of improved US/PRC relations, and the specific advantages to the PRC's neighbors of placing Peking in the position of having to violate the declaration if it embarked on the threat or use of force. At least some Asian allies might see merit in these arguments.

The reaction of Japan would require particular attention. If discussion of a US-Chinese renunciation of force agreement were undertaken without adequate preparation and advance consultation with the Japanese, it could inspire distrust of our motives, stimulate anxieties about the future of US-Japanese security ties, and precipitate displays of undesired forms of independence in their defense and foreign policy. These negative reactions could be mitigated, however, if the Japanese were carefully prepared for the prospect of such discussions. Although any gesture designed to improve US relations with Peking will occasion complications in the domestic political calculations of the GOJ, so, for that matter, does the persistence of confrontation. A renunciation of force agreement might provide the Japanese public with some additional reassurance against the real or imagined threat of Chinese nuclear blackmail.

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It is possible that Japan and other Asian allies might wish to "multilateralize" the agreement by arriving at similar agreements with the PRC. There is no apparent reason why the US should object to this.

C. Soviet Reaction. The proposal would not directly conflict with any of our objectives in SALT. Moreover, we would not wish to permit the Soviets to introduce political linkage into SALT, or permit them to use SALT -- or negotiations on other fronts -- to determine our policy toward the PRC.

To the extent that actual achievement of such an agreement between the US and PRC might tend to keep the Soviet Union somewhat off-balance, both the US and the PRC might find that effect useful.

D. Domestic Reaction. It is possible that some critics of US involvement in Asia might seek to portray the agreement (if it were actually concluded) as reducing the need for US commitments to Asian countries and for the capabilities necessary to support such commitments. On the other hand, such an agreement (or the effort to achieve one) would represent a further demonstration of the Administration's desire to effect a more workable relationship with the PRC. This should be well-received, and public understanding of the Administration's efforts to improve stability in the region through political means might, overall, help counter criticism of continuing US involvement.

IV. Question of Linkage with Troop Reduction - Withdrawal Issue

Troop withdrawals from Taiwan would improve the prospects for any move to better US-PRC relations. However, there would be no advantage to making a direct link between a renunciation of force agreement and the question of reduction or withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan. Our military forces on Taiwan are there in large part to support operations in Southeast Asia. We believe there is no need to seek a quid pro quo from Peking for their reduction or withdrawal. Moreover, to link a renunciation of force agreement to the troop reduction-withdrawal issue might lessen our future flexibility in using bases on Taiwan if the contingency should arise.

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Any kind of linkage would have a drastic effect on the GRC if the GRC became aware of it, since the GRC would have no confidence whatever in any such renunciation by the PRC. We should take the position with the GRC that the agreement was pursued for its own merits and that it was not in itself the basis for any US troop reduction or withdrawal from Taiwan.

A renunciation of force agreement would have utility as a political symbol without being linked to the question of a reduction in US military presence in Taiwan. In fact, to make such a linkage in our initial proposal could risk detracting from its utility as a political symbol.

As a possible means of influencing Peking to postpone resolution of the Taiwan issue and move toward improved relations, troop reductions or withdrawal would be of equal value if made unilaterally (or in consultation with the GRC) and then called to the attention of Peking as an indication of US intentions. In fact, the nature of the Chinese "psyche" suggests that this approach may have greater effect than explicit linkage in negotiation.

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US MILITARY PRESENCE ON TAIWAN

(Annex to NSSM 106 - China Policy)

1. Total US Military Personnel:

The current total authorized US military strength on Taiwan is 8,877. Breakdown of Service totals are as follows:

	<u>USAF</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MC</u>
USASTRATCOM		639		
314th TAW	1,173			
Det 1, 405th TFW	18			
327th AD	148			
Combat Support Group	4,753			
Other*	<u>913</u>	<u>476</u>	<u>733</u>	<u>24</u>
Totals	7,005	1,115	733	24

\* Includes COMUSTDC (192), MAAG (293), Intelligence and other activities

2. Intelligence Functions:

Although a separate study is being made by the intelligence community on the effects of possible changes in the size and missions of US intelligence activities on Taiwan, the following basic factors must be noted here: (1) the composition of these activities are almost totally military and the number of US military personnel involved is a significant portion of the total US military strength on Taiwan; (2) these activities primarily serve essential national and regional strategic requirements as well as local defense requirements.

3. US Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC):

The current authorized US military strength is 192. COMUSTDC provides the planning and control responsibilities of a functioning, in-place head-

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quarters charged with contingency responsibilities involving the operational control of ground, sea, and air forces of two nations under the Mutual Defense Treaty when so directed. This involves the following, among other, responsibilities: (a) bilateral TDC/GRC planning, to include major and minor exercises, (b) unilateral US planning, (c) coordinate joint US military intelligence activities on Taiwan, and (d) negotiate with GRC to provide support of US forces as may be required under base rights agreements and the Mutual Defense Treaty.

COMUSTDC was established as a subordinate unified commander in September 1958. This resulted from the requirement of Commander, Seventh Fleet (who was assigned the mission for the defense of Taiwan upon the outbreak of the Korean War) to establish a headquarters ashore in Taiwan to effectively discharge this mission.

4. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China: Responsibilities and Functions (MAAG, China):

The present MAAG China authorized military strength of 293 reflects reductions of 69.4% since 1 July 1961 and 64.0% since the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964. Of even greater importance are the very heavy annual net reductions of the past three years: FY 69 - 15.9%; FY 70 - 32.8%; FY 71 - 25.3%.

MAAG, China functions are set forth in Appendix 1. Although these functions are technically diverse, some of which stem from US legal requirements, the central objectives include: (a) development of Military Assistance (Grant Aid/FMS) plans and programs; (b) provision of appropriate guidance on doctrine, planning, programming, and advisory and technical assistance to the GRC in the organization, equipping and training of its military forces; and (c) assure

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host country compliance with pertinent bilateral agreements relating to Military Assistance.

It must be noted that many highly technical and critical areas remain outside of current GRC capabilities, especially in the areas of air defense, naval operations, supply, maintenance and other logistic areas.

MAAG, China was established shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War.

5. The US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRATCOM - Taiwan):

This command has total authorized strength of 639 military personnel. The USASTRATCOM Long Lines Battalion with its subordinate components provides, operates, and maintains inter-island long haul, point-to-point strategic communications systems to include allocated circuits as well as common-user services; provides, operates, and maintains USA Strategic Communications Systems/Defense Communications System facilities to include a major relay station, receiver and transmitter facilities, associated key links, inter-island radio relay system consisting of radio relay equipment and outside plant wire facilities, and to provide allocated circuits and common-user services as required for all US military and other authorized US agencies on Taiwan. It manages communications-electronics (C-E) resources to support US military and other government activities as directed by CG, USASTRATCOM-PAC; and it provides post, camp, and station operational C-E support to all US Government agencies located within the Taipei-Taiwan area to include: Communications Center Operations, Dial Central Exchange Telephone Operation, Telephone Installation and Repair, outside Plant Cable and Wire Support. Hence, in summary, this command not only provides the above cited local

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services on Taiwan but is a key link in the strategic communications  
systems inter-connecting all of East Asia.

Strategic communications facilities were initially established on  
Taiwan shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, continually improved  
and consolidated, and formally designated as USASTRATCOM - Taiwan in  
October 1968.

6. US Air Force 314th Tactical Airlift Wing (314 TAW):

This command with its four assigned tactical airlift squadrons of  
C-130E aircraft based at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, has a total authorized  
strength of 1,173.

In execution of its mission, this unit utilizes C-130E aircraft to  
provide theater airlift support for PACOM forces which includes tactical air  
resupply, special operations and air evacuation. It is required to support  
all major CINCPAC OPlans. One CINCPAC plan and the Joint US-ROC ROCHESTER  
plan provide for PACOM theater forces to defend Taiwan, while other CINCPAC  
OPlans provide for defense of Korea and other areas in Asia.

Taiwan provides an optimum geographic location for readiness posture to  
provide airlift support to US forces and allies in Northeast Asia or Southeast  
Asia, an important element of the Nixon Doctrine. This includes peacetime  
logistic and airlift support of all major CINCPAC OPlans.

The 314th TAW was established on Taiwan in January 1966.

7. US Air Force Detachment 1, 405th Tactical Fighter Wing (Det 1, 405th TFW):

This unit is located at Tainan with 4 to 6 F-4 aircraft and an authorized  
strength of 18 US military personnel.

25X5

The unit also has the mission of participating

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in Pacific Command theater defense of Taiwan as required by a CINCPAC OPlan. Since the shoot-down of an EC-121 over the China Sea, the detachment was assigned another mission which is maintaining fighter aircraft on alert status at such times as required to protect US peacetime reconnaissance aircraft operating in the area. This mission is in support of US strategic interests rather than merely the defense of Taiwan, as the reconnaissance aircraft collect information for which there are national intelligence requirements.

25X5

This detachment was established on Taiwan in January 1955 as a 5th Air Force Detachment, acquiring its present designation in April 1961.

8. US Air Force 327th Air Division (327th AD):

This unit is based at Taipei Air Station with an authorized US military strength of 148 personnel and consists of a small headquarters which currently commands only two operational aircraft units -- the 314th TAW and a detachment of the 405th TFW. Its mission includes preparations for commanding greatly increased forces in the event of contingency operations on Taiwan. The manning of this unit is currently so low that any further reduction could make it incapable of accomplishing its mission.

This unit was established in Taiwan in January 1955 under another designation.

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9 Other US Military Units:

a. US Air Force: The Air Force Combat Support Group headquarters units, which, with their associated supply, civil engineering, security police, transportation and Services squadrons and hospital or dispensary functions, provide required housekeeping support to units based at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Shu Lin Kou Air Station, Tainan Air Base and Taipei Air Station, total an authorized military strength of approximately 4,753 personnel. These units exist only to support the Air Force units previously described. Their importance and the impact of reduction or removal of these units is the same as for the supported unit. Additionally, there are also 913 in TDC, MAAG and Intelligence functions.

b. US Army: The total US Army authorized military strength on Taiwan is 1,115 personnel, with over one-half the total in the STRATCOM Group and the remainder functioning in MAAG, TDC and Security (Intelligence) capacities and logistics missions.

c. US Navy and Marine Corps: The total US Navy and Marine Corps authorized strength on Taiwan is 733 personnel of which over one-third the total serve in MAAG, TDC and Security (Intelligence) capacities and almost all the remainder in local and theater support missions. The largest of these units are Headquarters, Support Activity (221), US Navy Hospital (109) and Navy Exchanges and Commissaries (65) which include support for the official US community.

Appendix: Responsibilities and Functions of MAAG, China

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(C) Responsibilities and Functions

a. Under the military command of CINCPAC, the Chief of the MAAG will:

- (1) Make recommendations to CINCPAC, concerning Military Assistance (Grant Aid/FMS) to the GRC.
- (2) Develop Military Assistance (Grant Aid/FMS) plans and programs in cooperation with the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission and other elements of the Country Team, and submit them to CINCPAC.
- (3) Observe and report on the utilization of material furnished and personnel trained at the expense of the United States.
- (4) Assure host country compliance with pertinent bilateral agreements relating to declaration and release of excess Military Assistance Program property, and provide timely instruction to host country on disposition of such property in accordance with DOD directives.
- (5) Provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the GRC on military assistance, including training assistance and, within guidelines provided by higher authority, encourage the sale of US-produced military equipment to the GRC, and provide guidance on planning and programming for future FMS to meet valid country requirements.
- (6) Administer FMS transactions in accordance with current instructions.
- (7) Make recommendations to CINCPAC concerning off-shore procurement of military assistance material or services.
- (8) Provide appropriate guidance on doctrine, planning, and programming, and advisory and technical assistance to the GRC in

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the organization, equipping and training of military forces in order to develop and maintain self-sufficiency programs in support of the Armed Forces.

(9) Work directly with the military departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military assistance material, training, and services in the Republic of China.

(10) Provide liaison with GRC with respect to weapons production and residual off-shore procurement matters.

(11) Provide, as appropriate, advisory services and technical assistance to the GRC armed forces with respect to production of munitions and ordnance, vehicles, clothing, rations, rubber products, batteries, and topographic maps.

(12) When appropriate, act as channel of communication for the DDR&E regarding research and development matters between the United States and the GRC. Act as channel of communication for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) regarding production and other logistic matters between the United States and the GRC. CINCPAC shall be kept informed of all such communications.

(13) Provide liaison with the GRC with respect to any other military assistance requirements or logistic matters of the DOD and perform such other functions as may be required under foreign assistance legislation.

b. In discharging these responsibilities, the Chief of the MAAG will be guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the Military Assistance Manual, Annex J to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, applicable Department of Defense directives and instructions, and such other directives as may be issued by appropriate authority.

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c. The release of classified US military information of any nature to representatives of the GRC will be in accordance with appropriate documents authorizing disclosure of information to foreign governments or with approval of CINCPAC. In the event GRC authorities request military advice or information of a strategic nature from the MAAG, such requests will be referred to CINCPAC. US War Plans will not be divulged to foreign nationals without the specific authority of CINCPAC. CINCPAC will be advised by the Chief of the MAAG of any action taken by GRC authorities as a result of receiving strategic advice from the United States or from any other source, if such is known. CINCPAC will, in turn, keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised, as appropriate.

d. No member of the MAAG will assume any duty as a result of which he will be responsible to the GRC.

Source: CINCPAC Ser 0467, 24 April 1967, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: Terms of Reference; forwarding of

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HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT ACTIVITY, TAIPEI  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
BOX 75 APO  
SAN FRANCISCO 96365

G. 4548/12  
5310  
Sec 1145  
7 April 1977

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Republic of China  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Population Report

Ref: (a) COMUSDOC CAT 5310.1 (CONTAL)

Encl: (1) Area Population Report  
(2) Quarterly Population Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded for your information.

S. A. STANFORD  
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1 CTF 76 (COMFIFTHSEVENTHFLT)  
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1 CO USA STRATCOM SIG GP  
1 CO NAMRU-2  
2 AD USDAO  
3 COMR 6211TH ABG APO 96340  
3 COMR 698TH SG APO 96360  
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1 ALL HSA DEPTS  
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AREA POPULATION REPORT  
AS OF 31 MAR 1971

LOCATION	ARMY			NAVY			AIR FORCE			MARINES			CIVILIANS			TOTALS		
	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	PRIN	FAM	DEPN	PRIN	FAM	DEPN
DADEI	687	311	829	514	337	921	818	532	1313	24	8	24	299	372	1125	299	1532	1229
LANOU	218	92	161	169	30	72	835	305	269				2			1263	127	1100
SANCIN													22	1	2	22	1	2
ATCHUNG G C K	26	12	33	32	21	13	4336	469	607				67	51	115	4393	545	1071
HAT-11																		
ATMAN	31	14	20	43	21	53	657	332	875				3	30	67	764	117	104
ALUSTONE NOTING	74	9	22	63	42	115	1	5	7	9	9	26	12	6	14	166	66	121
YACHTUNG							14	14	12				3	2	2	19	18	41
ATSU	2			1														
YUMEN	3			1														
YANGLIAD							6											
TOTALS	990	450	1031	848	451	1211	6671	1671	3912	33	17	30	401	467	1227	8945	3047	1299

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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